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Abstract 
 
We investigate the implications of the OECD support for agriculture on the headcount 
poverty rates of developing countries. Following the strategy proposed by McMillan, 
Peterson Zwane, and Ashraf (2005, 2007), we estimate the cross-country empirical 
framework building a new OECD policy index and applying different panel data techniques. 
In addition to the standard parametric model estimators, we also use the finite mixture 
models to detect heterogeneous effects of the OECD policy index within our sample. We find 
statistically significant evidence that OECD agricultural policies worsened the poverty rates 
in some developing countries. Most of the main food exporters appear in fact to be 
negatively affected by the OECD support for agriculture while the impact detected on food 
importers is not significant or near to zero. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Agricultural policies continue to be a major concern in global trade negotiations. For 
decades, the agricultural sector has been in fact highly protected in advanced economies 
while it has borne a high direct and indirect burden in developing countries, respectively 
through taxes on agricultural exports and industrial substitution policies (Anderson, 2010a; 
Krueger, Schiff, & Valdés, 1988; Schiff & Valdés, 2002). All these sets of measures have 
been responsible for reducing national and global welfare, inhibit growth rates and add 
poverty to developing countries (Anderson, 2010b). 
The creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 encouraged trade 
liberalization measures to reach economic development targets. Shortly after, in 2001, the 
multilateral negotiations known as the Doha Round started to put pressure on national 
governments to comply with long-term objectives of creating a fairer trading system and 
eliminating distortions in the agricultural world market. The Doha Development Agenda 
asked, in particular, developed countries to reduce their domestic support and eliminate 
export subsidies for agricultural commodities (Shaw, 2007). However, after more than a 
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decade, members countries still seem unable to bring to a successful conclusion the bulk of 
the negotiations, confirming agricultural issues among the most controversial topics to reach 
an agreement on (Hebebrand & Josling, 2011; Matthews, 2013). 
Large agricultural direct subsidies in OECD countries have been claimed to create an 
unfair competitive environment and distort world trade dynamics by lowering international 
market prices of food and agricultural commodities below their production costs (Aksoy & 
Beghin, 2005; Beghin Roland-Holst, & van der Mensbrugghe, 2002). 
Moreover, market access barriers, such as import tariffs, import restrictions on raw and 
processed agricultural commodities, non-tariff barriers, etc., have contributed to even more 
welfare losses in global terms (Anderson, Martin, & Valenzuela, 2006; Hertel & Keeney, 
2006). The consequent inability of lower income countries to compete on distorted markets 
may have hampered the development of their primary sector. This may reflect on the whole 
economic process of poorer economies, considering that the largest part of their population 
relies on agricultural activities for their living (World Bank, 2007). 
The effects of OECD agricultural practices may vary depending on the trade and 
productive structure of lower income countries . On one hand, the OECD subsidized regime 
is pointed out to depress the world prices and harm the current and potential exporters of 
agricultural products. As a consequence, its withdrawal has the effect of expanding the 
output production in those countries. On the other hand, some scholars suggested the 
theoretical possibility that the effects of the removal of OECD support are not so 
straightforward, detecting instead a negative impact for the development process of the net 
food importers and developing countries involved in preferential trade agreements 
(Bhagwati, 2005; Panagariya, 2002, 2005). It has been also found that restricted trade 
regimes amplifies the volatility of world food prices (Tyers & Anderson, 1992). When a 
country sets a policy isolating the domestic food market from international prices 
fluctuations, in fact, other countries in turn alter their agricultural trade measures causing the 
weakening of the original attempt and the increase of the global price volatility (Anderson, 
2013). This price instability might have hampered the poorest people, who devote a large 
proportion of their income on food expenditures, and inequality rates in developing countries 
(Caracciolo & Santeramo, 2013; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
2011). The issue is contentiously discussed, also in light of the increasing agricultural 
protection in Eastern Europe and East Asian countries. 
The aim of our paper is to investigate the effects of the OECD trade and agriculture 
policies on developing countries using panel data models. The likely impact of eliminating 
the agricultural trade distortions on the global and national welfare has been assessed so far 
using Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models. Although developing countries tend 
to be affected in different ways by the removal of subsidies in the OECD countries, most of 
the analyses detected a pro-development net effect (Stiglitz & Charlton, 2005). Simulating 
the removal of the OECD subsidies and trade barriers, Diao, Diaz-Bonilla, Robinson, and 
Orden (2005) showed results conducive to an increase of the agricultural exports and, 
consequently, of the value added of the primary sector in developing countries. Their model 
also predicted that the increasing agricultural production led to multiplicative effects on the 
overall GDP, boosting the employment rate and the demand for non-agricultural goods and 
services. Using long term projections, the LINKAGE model of the World Bank calculated 
the impact of removing all the market distortions on the world economy. Using the database 
built by Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), the projections suggested that the reforms 
intervened to correct distortions during the past decades led to an overall gain of 233 billion 
of USD per year (Valenzuela, van der Mensbrugghe, & Anderson, 2009). Simulating, 
instead, a global removal of all agricultural subsidies, taxes and import tariffs on the world 
baseline economy in 2004, the global gain would be around 168 billion of USD per year. 
Even if negative effects may be tracked for some developing countries, Valenzuela et al. 
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(2009) calculated a net farm incomes increasing of 5.6 percent in developing countries, 
confirming the effectiveness of this strategy to alleviate poverty and inequality. 
In alternative to the CGE models, a cross-country regression framework was first 
proposed by McMillan, Peterson Zwane, and Ashraf (2005, 2007). They built an index that 
weighted own OECD agricultural support on the agricultural production of developing 
economies for the period 1982-2000. They found no robust evidence that the OECD 
agricultural subsidies captured by the index worsen poverty rates or income in various 
samples, i.e. including all developing countries, the Cairns Group  and historical food 
importers . Using the same index, Dewbre, Thompson, and Dewbre (2007) estimated, 
instead, a negative effect on farm income growth in all the developing economies included in 
their sample, although with low statistical significance. 
Our investigation is new in many respects. Our first innovation is to build a new measure 
to estimate the impact of the support for OECD agriculture on the poorer economies. We 
employ the same methodology proposed by McMillan et al. (2005, 2007) using instead a 
different database that includes a longer time series and the OECD support measure for 
cotton, an heavily subsidized commodity especially in United States, which was not 
accounted by the authors. We estimate the impact of our OECD agricultural policy index 
using the standard parametric models (i.e. OLS, FE and FGLS) considering the pre-assigned 
samples: all developing countries, the Cairns Groups and the food importers. For the latest, 
we consider all the countries with a long-term net food importer status. We also employ the 
finite mixture models estimation approach to deal with possible sources of heterogeneity in 
our specification. Parameters may in fact vary in cross-country and panel growth regressions 
(Durlauf, 2001). Moreover, the standard parametric models do not take into account the 
unobserved heterogeneity due, for example, to institutional, cultural and geographical 
factors, initial conditions of the countries (Bloom, Canning, & Sevilla, 2003; Desdoigts, 
1999), or omitted variables in the specification (Aitkin, 1999). Introducing latent effects to 
model heterogeneity sources, the finite mixture models allow for an endogenous (i.e. 
posterior) clustering of the countries. The assumption is that each country has some 
probability to be assigned to a specific group (or latent class), based on the random 
parameters associated to some elements of the covariate set. Data then attribute each country 
to a specific group and draw the number of clusters. For our analysis, we associate a random 
parameter to the constant and to our OECD agricultural policy index, considering that - as 
emerged in the debate - the effects of the rich-countries agricultural policies may differ due 
to some developing countries' trade characteristics. Using both kind of techniques, our 
econometric results show that the OECD support policies are likely to worsen poverty rates, 
especially in large net food exporters. 
The paper is structured as follows: after this introduction the Section 2 describes the 
samples and the construction of the OECD policy index. Section 3 presents the empirical 
strategy and the related methodology. In the Section 4 our results are described and 
discussed. The Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Data 
 
Our sample includes 67 countries classified by the World Bank as low-, lower-middle- 
and upper middle-income countries, for the period 1978-2009
i
. We consider all the 
developing countries that have at least two observations for the headcount poverty rate. 
Considering our interest in historical agricultural production, we exclude some countries for 
which data on agricultural output were not available in the early '60s (mostly ex-Soviet 
Republics) and small islands with a very limited agricultural sector. 
To calculate the OECD support for agriculture, we consider the richest economies that 
subsidized their agricultural sectors since the '60s. 
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As anticipated, we estimate the impact of the OECD agricultural policy index on all the 
developing countries and then on subsamples that group together only the members of the 
Cairns Group and the food importers, respectively. The Cairns Group is composed by 
competitive agricultural exporting countries which account for more than 25% of the world's 
agricultural exports
ii
. For the sub-sample of the net food importers, we consider all the 
countries with a long-term (i.e. during the whole time period) net food importer status. For 
the identification of these countries, we rely on the classification proposed by Ng and Aksoy 
(2008)
iii
. Appendix 1 lists the classification of all the countries included in all our samples 
and of the OECD countries considered. In Appendix 2 it is reported the food and the general 
agriculture trade status of the developing countries included in our sample
iv
. 
 
2.1. The OECD Agricultural Support Index 
 
We now describe the procedure we have followed to build our country- and time-specific 
index measuring the implicit production-weighted subsidy faced by each developing country. 
For its construction, we use the World Bank database “Global Estimates of Distortions to 
Agricultural Incentives” created by Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) and its updated version 
by Anderson and Nelgen (2012)
v
. These databases reports on commodity-specific and 
aggregate agricultural distortions for both developed and developing countries 
complementing and broadening the existent database built by Krueger et al., OECD and 
IFPRI (Anderson, 2010a). 
To calculate our index we employ the methodology proposed by McMillan et al. (2005, 
2007) using, as said, a different database and time span. McMillan et al. (2005, 2007) used 
the database from the OECD Trade and Agriculture Directorate (available data from 1987) 
and US Department of Agriculture (USDA) (for the period 1982-1990). They used three 
types of indicators that identify the agricultural support: the Producer Support Estimates 
(PSEs), the Producer Nominal Protection Coefficients (NPCs) and the Nominal Assistance 
Coefficients (NACs). In their econometric analysis, the authors used the NPCs variable as a 
measure of OECD agricultural support, although claiming lack of results also when using the 
other measures. Details on the support measures are in the Appendix 3. 
In a perfectly competitive economy with no market failures, a country would maximize 
the national welfare allowing domestic farm and consumer price of a (homogenous) product 
to equal the international price multiplied by the country' exchange rate. Any government-
imposed intervention that shifts the price from equality is considered welfare reducing 
(Anderson, 2010b). To track these distortions in the agricultural sector, we use the Nominal 
Rates of Assistance (NRAs) that combine tariffs on imports of competing commodities, 
direct subsidies (or taxes) to production and subsidies (or taxes) to the farm use of 
intermediate inputs (Anderson, Croser, Sandri, & Valenzuela, 2009)
vi
. A positive NRA 
represents essentially the percentage by which the government policies raise gross returns to 
farmers of a specific agricultural commodity above what they would be without 
government's intervention. 
Our index includes the following agricultural commodities: barley, oat, maize, wheat, 
rice, beef, pig meat, poultry, sheep meat, eggs, milk, sugar, cotton, wool, rapeseed, soybeans 
and sunflowers. 
Differently from McMillan et al. (2005, 2007), we also include cotton, a commodity 
heavily subsidized in the United States. The commodities we choose are the most heavily 
subsidized agricultural goods produced in the OECD for which the data are available for all 
the OECD countries in our sample. 
For each commodity listed above, first we obtain the weighted mean of NRA across 
OECD countries using as weights each country's share of production. 
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We then weight the average OECD NRAs, obtained in the previous step for each 
commodity, with the share of the commodity in each developing country' historical 
agricultural output in 1961. Moreover, the choice of using historical production structure 
rather than the current one avoids a problem of endogeneity, i.e. that the current agricultural 
output may be determined by the OECD support level, and address the issue of the potential 
of export of developing countries
vii
. 
 
Figure 1. Agricultural Support in Europe, Japan and US 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Agricultural Support (Nominal Rate of Assistance) by Commodities in OECD 
Countries 
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Countries with a traditional agriculture production oriented to tropical commodities or 
large food importers would have lower OECD index values, while countries with a primary 
sector structure that competes directly with agricultural products heavily subsidized by the 
OECD countries would have instead a higher value of the index. 
Details on the trend of general agricultural support for Europe, US and Japan (as the main 
subsidizers), and commodity specific support are illustrated in Figures 1 and Figure 2. In 
particular, Figure 1 shows that the overall support in high-income countries increases 
steadily until the end of the '80s, apart from a fall when the international food prices rose in 
1973-1974. During the '90s, the aggregate OECD NRA started to decline, probably 
influenced by decoupled programs
viii
 (Anderson, 2010b), remaining however higher in Japan. 
Figure 2 illustrates instead the trend for each commodity. 
Among the grains, rice is the most subsidized commodity, especially in Japan. Livestock 
and its by-products are mostly subsidized in the United States, as well as cotton. In Europe, 
the commodity that receives larger support is sugar. 
 
3. Empirical Strategy 
 
3.1. Standard Parametric Models 
 
We estimate the following equation 
 
HPit=α+β1OECDpolicyit+ ∑ βk
K
k=2 Xit+τt+εit                                       (1) 
 
where HP is the headcount poverty rate for the country i at time t (i.e. the percentage of 
population living below the absolute poverty line of 1.25 USD/day) and the variable 
OECDpolicy is the index that measures OECD support described in the previous section. As 
both the dependent variable and the OECDpolicy index are expressed in log, 𝛽1 represents 
the elasticity of poverty in lower income countries with respect to the agricultural support in 
high-income countries. The vector X includes K control variables found relevant by the 
literature, and especially in McMillan et al. (2005, 2007). 
In particular, a measure that summarizes the Southern Oscillation Anomaly (SOI) is included 
for controlling global weather shocks
ix
. The inflation rate and trade variable (as the sum of 
total import and export over GDP) are added as controls for own-country policies, as well as 
a polity score that measures the degree of democracy in the country (Lledó, Yackovlev & 
Gadenne, 2011; Yang, 2008)
x
. 
The headcount poverty ratio, the inflation rate and the trade variables are from the World 
Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI), the polity score (democracy) is calculated by 
the Polity IV Project and the Southern Oscillation weather measure is based on data from the 
National Oceanic And Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) (see details in Appendix 4). 
This set of regressors allows to preserve a reasonable number of observations on poverty. 
𝜏𝑡  is time specific effect common to all countries, 𝛼 is the constant and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term. 
The effects of the OECD support may depend on whether the country is a net importer or 
a net exporter. To take into account these possible heterogeneous effects of the variable 
OECDpolicy due to the different trade status of developing countries, we first estimate the 
Eq. (1) for all the developing countries and then we keep in the sample first the members of 
the Cairns Group and then only the food importers. Details on the countries included are in 
Appendix 1. 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for all the variables used in the estimations 
considering the whole sample of developing countries, the Cairns Group and the net food 
importers. The Cairns Group has a lower average poverty rate than the net food importers, 
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that gather together the poorest countries mostly located in the Sub-Saharan Africa. As 
expected, the OECD policy index is higher for the Cairns Group that competes directly in 
international markets with the agricultural output of the OECD countries. Their inflation rate 
is also higher than the net food importers, considering that most of the Latin American 
countries are included in the Cairns Group. The trade openness and the level of democracy 
for the net food importers is, respectively, higher and (much) lower than the average levels 
for the Cairns Group. 
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std dev Min  Max 
 
Summary statistics:  
All developing countries 
OECD policy index 2912 0.64 0.60 0 3.64 
Log consumer price index 2306 0.16 0.33 -0.14 5.50 
Trade openness 2607 0.69 0.39 0.003 3.75 
Democracy 2582 0.66 6.72 -10 10 
Summary statistics:  
The Cairns Group 
Head count poverty rate 217 12.43 12.82 0 68.16 
OECD policy index 512 0.80 0.48 0.047 2.71 
Log consumer price index 477 0.25 0.56 -0.011 4.77 
Trade openness 512 0.58 0.37 0.11 2.20 
Democracy 512 4.49 5.91 -9 10 
Summary statistics:  
The net food importers 
Head count poverty rate 180 26.89 26.78 0 92.55 
OECD policy index 1376 0.55 0.59 0 3.42 
Log consumer price index 1031 0.12 0.16 -0.10 1.54 
Trade openness 1167 0.76 0.41 0.063 3.75 
Democracy 1170 -0.11 6.60 -10 10 
      
 
We carry out our analysis using Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (POLS), Fixed Effects 
(FE) and Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) estimations. 
Pooled Ordinary Least Squares combines cross-sectional data on N units and T time 
periods, i.e. a total of N X T observations. FE captures instead the presence of unobservable 
and time invariant country-specific characteristics 𝛼𝑖 that are wiped off from the estimation 
by subtracting from each time period's observation its country mean value. The inefficiencies 
related to possible presence of the heteroskedastic-clustered standard errors and/or 
autocorrelated structure of the errors are corrected using FGLS. Considering our panel 
structure with N > T, we can compute a regression only with groupwise heteroskedasticity 
but not the heteroskedastic error structure with cross-sectional correlation (Greene, 2003; 
Hoechle, 2007). Due to the dispersion of the data, we specify the AR(1) autocorrelation 
structure of the errors only for the sub-sample including the Cairn Group that presents longer 
and consecutive observations
xi
. 
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3.2. Finite Mixture Models 
 
To confirm the results obtained by our a priori grouping, we use the finite mixture 
models to detect homogeneous group-structures in the full set of observations. The finite 
mixture models approach (Alfò, Trovato, & Waldmann, 2008; Paap, Franses, & van Dijk, 
2005) allows the introduction of random components (or latent variables) to gain flexibility 
in modelling a heterogeneous population that, otherwise, would be represented by a single 
distribution. The method can be seen as a semiparametric compromise between a full 
parametric model represented by a single distribution and a nonparametric model represented 
by as many different distributions as the number of observations (McLachlan & Pell, 2000). 
In details, the finite mixture approach proposes that the overall conditional density can be 
represented by a weighted summation of g different density functions (or groups). The 
number of g clusters is treated as fixed and estimated via penalized likelihood criteria. It is 
assumed that each observation i has some probability to get assigned to these groups. The 
weights of each density function and its parameters represent the unknown values to estimate 
and the main interest for using this approach. 
The maximum likelihood (ML) estimation with the iterative EM (Expectation-
Maximization) algorithm is the method used to estimate the unknown components of the 
finite mixture model. In particular, the E-step takes the conditional expectation of the log-
likelihood function for complete data with respect to the latent variables. The M-step 
maximizes the expected log-likelihood obtained with the E-step for the parameters of the 
model. The iteration with the E- and the M-steps continues until the log-likelihood 
improvement reaches an arbitrarily small amount, i.e. a convergence. For analytical details, 
see McLachlan and Pell (2000) and Grün and Leisch (2008)xii. To choose among the number 
of mixture components, we use selection criteria penalizing for the number of parameters 
and observations in the model, such as Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) and Consistent 
Akaike Information Criterion (CAIC). 
This estimation method fits the purpose of our study particularly well. The OECD policy 
measures may have in fact a different (or even opposite) impact on different countries. Also 
the constant term may be heterogeneous among economies reflecting, for example, the 
income distribution structure and other countries' characteristics not detected by the 
covariates of our model. 
 
4. Results 
 
Tables 2 to 7 show our empirical results under all the estimation methods and the post-
estimation results of country-grouping obtained using FMM
xiii
. 
Table 2 reports the estimated coefficients of the OECDpolicy variable and of the other 
covariates on the headcount poverty rate for the sample including all developing countries 
for which poverty data are available. 
The OEC policy coefficient is always positive and is statistically significant with POLS, 
FGLS and FMM estimations (0.502, 0.490 and 0.829 respectively). In other words, we detect 
a positive relationship between the OECD support measure and the poverty rates in 
developing countries. The FE estimate of the coefficient is positive but not significant. The 
openness to trade as well as the democracy variable appear to lower poverty rates for POLS, 
FGLS and FMM. 
The results for the sample including the countries of the Cairns Group (Table 3) confirm 
and reinforce the initial statement that the OECD agriculture support policy may be 
negatively related to the development process of food exporting countries. The estimated 
coefficients of the OECD policy variable are positive and significant using all estimators (for 
OLS and FE at the 10% level of significance, for FGLS at the 5% level) and their values are 
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higher than the ones obtained for the sample including all the countries (1.064, 1.457 and 
0.916 respectively for POLS, FE and FGLS). The FE estimate is significant (at the 10% 
level), which contrasts with the result obtained by McMillan et al. (2005, 2007). For this 
group of countries, the coefficient of openness to trade is negatively related to the poverty 
rates (even though not significant using FE) and the inflation rate is significant only for the 
FGLS and positively linked to poverty. 
 
 
Table 2. Headcount poverty rate and OECD agriculture subsidies: All the countries 
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Poverty POLS FE FGLS FMM 
OECD policy 
0.502** 
(0.254) 
0.536 
(0.482) 
0.490*** 
(0.175) 
0.829*** 
(0.139) 
SOI 
0.322 
(0.518) 
0.001 
(0.044) 
0.587 
(0.377) 
0.0003 
(0.020) 
Inflation 
-0.231 
(0.197) 
0.016 
(0.085) 
0.051 
(0.090) 
0.010 
(0.081) 
Trade openness 
-0.379** 
(0.176) 
-0.322 
(0.427) 
-0.296*** 
(0.106) 
-0.314*** 
(0.084) 
Democracy 
-0.070*** 
(0.011) 
0.023 
(0.018) 
-0.078*** 
(0.005) 
-0.011* 
(0.006) 
constant 
4.313*** 
(1.223) 
2.713*** 
(0.256) 
4.293*** 
(0.998) 
2.510*** 
(0.319) 
N 504 504 504 504 
R
2
 0.105 0.287   
F /Wald
2
 2.75  294.15  
Log-likelihood    -508.507 
sigma
2
    
0.306 
(0.019) 
g    5 
      
Note: p-values significance level: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Column (1): Pooled OLS with year dummies (omitted); Column (2): Fixed effect with 
year dummies (omitted) and robust standard errors; Column (3): Feasible Generalized 
Least Squares with year dummies (omitted) corrected by heteroskedastic panel; Column 
(4): Finite Mixture Model with latent effect on constant and OECD policy variables. g is 
the number of mixture components selected by the BIC criteria 
Considering the sample comprising the net food importers (Table 4), using all the 
estimators the OECDpolicy index is not significantly related to the percentage of poor. In 
fact, by construction, the OECDpolicy index tracks the effects of the rich-economies support 
on the production structure of the developing country, and this affects mainly the direct 
competitors on food and agricultural output. To track the hypothetical positive impact of the 
OECDpolicyindex in poorer countries, it would in fact require an index based the 
consumption patterns of economies affected by the lowering effect of international food 
prices. While the sign of the inflation rate is ambiguous, the presence of the democracy is the 
leading factor in decreasing the poverty rates for net food importers. 
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Table 3. Headcount Poverty Rate and OECD Agriculture Subsidies: the Cairns Group 
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) 
Poverty POLS FE FGLS 
OECDpolicy 
1.064* 
(0.558) 
1.457* 
(0.814) 
0.916** 
(0.378) 
SOI 
0.367 
(0.521) 
-0.008 
(0.134) 
0.113 
(0.118) 
Inflation 
0.005 
(0.214) 
0.089 
(0.141) 
0.174*** 
(0.058) 
Trade openness 
-1.009*** 
(0.268) 
-1.196 
(0.702) 
-0.415** 
(0.178) 
Democracy 
-0.066*** 
(0.025) 
0.026 
(0.023) 
-0.001 
(0.010) 
constant 
3.131*** 
(1.074) 
2.27*** 
(0.380) 
2.510*** 
(0.319) 
N 202 202 202 
R
2
 0.102 0.435  
F/ Wald
2
 1.70  93.02      
Note: p-values significance level: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Column (1): Pooled OLS with year dummies (omitted); Column (2): Fixed effect with 
year dummies (omitted) and robust standard errors; Column (3): Feasible Generalized 
Least Squares with year dummies (omitted) corrected by heteroskedastic panel and 
panel-specific AR(1) error structure 
 
Table 4. Headcount Poverty Rate and OECD Agriculture Subsidies: The Net Food 
Importers 
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) 
Poverty POLS FE FGLS 
OECD policy 
-0.062 
(0.417) 
0.246 
(0.795) 
-0.187 
(0.308) 
SOI 
-0.061 
(0.196) 
0.143 
(0.097) 
-0.029 
(0.156) 
Inflation 
-2.885*** 
(0.829) 
-0.461 
(0.278) 
-1.929*** 
(0.645) 
Trade openness 
-0.902** 
(0.345) 
0.315 
(0.225) 
-0.297 
(0.217) 
Democracy 
-0.037* 
(0.021) 
-0.008 
(0.024) 
-0.078*** 
(0.013) 
constant 
4.002*** 
(0.608) 
2.661*** 
(0.586) 
3.619*** 
(0.481) 
N 161 161 161 
R
2
 0.106 0.449  
F /Wald
2
 1.66  95.28 
     
Note: p-values significance level: * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. 
Column (1): Pooled OLS with year dummies (omitted); Column (2): Fixed effect with 
year dummies (omitted) and robust standard errors; Column (3): Feasible Generalized 
Least Squares with year dummies (omitted) corrected by heteroskedastic panel 
 
The finite mixture model enables us to cluster the countries and detect heterogeneous 
values for the constant and the OECD agricultural policy through all the sample. This 
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approach seems to better describe the data as shown in the Fig 3 that plots the density of the 
poverty variable and the ones obtained with the OLS and FMM estimations. 
 
 
Figure 3. Observed and Fitted Density Distribution 
 
The number of clusters g is selected by the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) and 
amounts to five (Table 5). Tables 6 and Table 7 show the list of countries grouped in each 
cluster, and their latent coefficients and density function probabilities, respectively. 
 
Table 5. Penalized Likelihood Criteria 
g 2 3 4 5 6 
log likelihood -658.963 -551.187 -528.737 -508.507 -505.544 
AIC 1325.92 1114.37 1073.475 1037.014 1035.088 
BIC 1367.707 1177.045 1157.037 1141.465 1160.429 
CAIC 1375.707 1189.045 1173.037 1161.465 1184.429 
 
Table 6. Country clusters 
Clusters  
1 Albania, Bulgaria, Egypt, Iran, Jamaica, Jordan, Malaysia, Romania, Thailand, 
Turkey, Uruguay 
2 Argentina, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Morocco, Tunisia 
3 Bolivia, Cambodia, Cameroon, China, Cote d'Ivoire, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Indonesia, Kenya, Lao PDR, Mauritania, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, South 
Africa, Vietnam 
4 Algeria, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, Nicaragua, Paraguay, 
Peru, Sri Lanka, Venezuela 
5 Bangladesh, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, India, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Swaziland, Tanzania, 
Uganda, Zambia 
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Table 7. Location for The Random Effects 
Clusters Constant OECDpolicy Probability 
1 -2.805 0.935 0.162 
2 -1.421 0.584 0.094 
3 0.357 0.274 0.264 
4 -0.428 0.001 0.154 
5 1.717 -0.855 0.326 
 
For each group, the constant and the estimated coefficient of the variable OECDpolicy 
are calculated summing up their respective values (Table 2, Column 4) with the 
correspondent latent effect obtained with countries' post-estimation grouping. The first two 
clusters identify the group of countries that have the lower constant term and a higher 
positive impact of the OECD policy measure on poverty. 
Among these two groups, there are five countries of the Cairns Group and other major 
agricultural exporters, such as Mexico, Turkey and Morocco. The third cluster groups the 
countries with higher constant and a still positive impact of the OECD policy measure. In 
this group, we recognize other members of the Cairn Group (Bolivia, Guatemala, Indonesia, 
Pakistan, Philippines and South Africa), some major exporters also from Sub-Saharan 
Africa, such as Cameroon and Cote d'Ivoire. The forth group includes the remaining 
countries of the Cairn Group that have a lower constant term and an additional impact of the 
OECD policy measure next to zero. Cluster 5 is the most numerous group of countries that 
accounts for the higher poverty rates. The coefficient for the OECDpolicy index offsets the 
overall coefficient accounting for an approximate zero effect of the agricultural support 
policy in the high-income countries. Low- and some lower-middle income economies, and 
most of the Sub-Saharan countries are included in this group. 
The results of the FMM estimations confirm then the results obtained by our a priori sub-
sampling choices. Differencing the countries based on the constant term and the OECD 
agricultural support measure shows that the poverty in developing countries is affected in 
opposite ways. All the largest food exporters, that are also lower-middle and upper-middle 
income countries, are negatively affected by the OECD agricultural support policy. The 
poorest countries and the food importers have a non-significant or near to zero effect of the 
OECDpolicy index. However, some exceptions to these general conclusions may be driven 
by the multidimensional differences among the countries that cannot be fully captured by 
cross-country econometric techniques. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
For decades, the primary sector of the developing countries has been depressed by their 
pro-industrial and urban bias, and by the high agricultural protection in advanced economies. 
Import barriers and subsidies in OECD countries contributed, in fact, to cause an 
overproduction of farm products in rich countries and bring distortion in the world trade 
dynamics. For this reason, donor countries have been often criticized for providing aid with 
one hand and using trade restrictions with the other. 
The effects of OECD agricultural practices are, however, widely discussed and may vary 
depending on the trade status of lower income countries. We test the impact of the OECD 
agricultural policies on headcount poverty rates, differentiating the developing countries 
based on their net food trade status. 
Building an appropriate index that weights the OECD agricultural support on the 
agricultural production path of developing countries, econometric results show that the 
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OECD support policies are likely to worsen poverty rates, especially in large food exporting 
countries. Consistently with the debate, no evidence or a near to zero impact is instead 
detected for net food importing countries. 
Continuing reforming the agricultural practice of high-income countries can contribute to 
the poverty alleviation targets of developing countries mostly affected by international 
distorted competition on agricultural output. Moreover, a more efficient and equitable trade 
environment could also help poorer countries to gain opportunities through reforming their 
agricultural sector, mostly neglected in favour of non-farm tradable activities. 
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Appendix 1. List of Countries 
 
List of countries included in the sample (67 in total), classified by income level 
(according to 2011 GNI per capita, the World Bank) 
Low-income economies (1,025 USD or less) (18): Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Burundi, 
Cambodia, Central African Republic, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda. 
Lower-middle-income economies (1,026 USD to 4,035 USD) (25): Albania, Bolivia, 
Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, 
India, Lao PDR, Lesotho, Morocco, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, 
Senegal, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Vietnam, Zambia. 
Upper-middle-income economies (4,036 USD to 12,475 USD) (24): Algeria, Argentina, 
Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Iran, Jamaica, Jordan, Malaysia, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Romania, South Africa, Thailand, 
Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela. 
OECD countries (20): Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherland, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States. 
Cairns Group
1 
(15): Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, 
Uruguay. 
                                                          
1 OECD countries included in the OECDpolicy index calculation are excluded from this list 
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Historical net food importers (29): Algeria, Bangladesh, Burundi, Central African 
Republic, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, 
Iran, Jamaica, Jordan, Lao PDR, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, 
Nigeria, Panama, Romania, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Uganda, Venezuela. 
 
Appendix 2.  Countries Agricultural Trade Status 
Country Net Food Trade Status Net Agriculture Trade Status 
Albania Exporter/Importer Importer 
Algeria Importer Importer 
Argentina Exporter Exporter 
Bangladesh Importer Importer 
Bolivia Importer/Exporter Exporter 
Botswana Importer/Exporter Importer 
Brazil Mostly Exporter Exporter 
Bulgaria Exporter Exporter 
Burkina Faso Importer/Exporter Exporter 
Burundi Importer Exporter 
Cambodia Exporter/Importer Exporter 
Cameroon Exporter Exporter 
Central African Republic Importer Exporter 
China Exporter Importer 
Colombia Exporter Exporter 
Costa Rica Exporter Exporter 
Cote d'Ivoire Importer/Exporter Exporter 
Dominican Republic Importer Mostly Importer 
Ecuador Exporter Exporter 
Egypt, Arab Rep. Importer Importer 
El Salvador Importer Mostly Exporter 
Fiji Importer Exporter 
Gambia, The Importer Importer 
Ghana Importer Exporter 
Guatemala Exporter Exporter 
Guinea-Bissau Importer Exporter 
Honduras Exporter Exporter 
India Importer/Exporter Exporter 
Indonesia Importer Exporter 
Iran, Islamic Rep. Importer Importer 
Jamaica Importer Importer 
Jordan Importer Importer 
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Kenya Importer/Exporter Exporter 
Lao PDR Importer Importer/Exporter 
Lesotho Importer Importer 
Madagascar Exporter Exporter 
Malawi Importer Exporter 
Malaysia Importer Exporter 
Mali Importer Exporter 
Mauritania Importer Importer 
Mexico Changing status Importer 
Morocco Exporter Importer 
Mozambique Importer Exporter/Importer 
Nepal Exporter/Importer Exporter/Importer 
Nicaragua Exporter Exporter 
Niger Importer Exporter 
Nigeria Importer Importer 
Pakistan Importer Importer 
Panama Importer Importer 
Paraguay Exporter Exporter 
Peru Exporter/Importer/Exporter Exporter 
Philippines Exporter/Importer Exporter/Importer 
Romania Importer Importer 
Rwanda Importer Exporter 
Senegal Exporter/Importer Exporter/Importer 
South Africa Exporter Exporter 
Sri Lanka Importer Exporter 
Swaziland Exporter Exporter 
Tanzania Mostly Importer Exporter 
Thailand Exporter Exporter 
Tunisia Importer Importer 
Turkey Exporter Exporter 
Uganda Importer Exporter 
Uruguay Exporter Exporter 
Venezuela, RB Importer Importer 
Vietnam Importer/Exporter Importer/Exporter 
Zambia Importer Exporter 
 
 
 
OECD Agrıcultural Subsıdıes and Poverty Rate… 
48 
 
Appendix 3.  OECD database 
 
To calculate the index that weighted OECD agricultural support, McMillan et al. (2005, 
2007) used three types of indicators: the Producer Support Estimates (PSEs), the Producer 
Nominal Protection Coefficients (NPCs) and the Nominal Assistance Coefficients (NACs). 
The PSEs calculate the annual monetary value of gross transfers from consumers and 
taxpayers to the agricultural producers, measured at farm gate level and arising from policies 
that support agriculture. The NACs are derived by the division of the value of gross farm 
receipts (including support) by the value of gross farm production at the border price (the 
international price). The NPCs are instead the ratios of average price received by the 
producer at the farm gate level (including payments per tonne of current output) and the 
border price (OECD, 2008). No support (i.e. no agriculture distortion) is implicitly indicated 
with a NPC equal to 1. OECD agricultural support was reported for selected commodities 
such as wheat, maize, rice, other grains, oilseed, sugar, milk, beef, sheep meat, wool, pig 
meat, poultry and eggs. Cotton is not included in their analysis. 
 
Appendix 4. List of variables 
Variable Definition and Source 
Head count poverty 
rate 
Percentage of the population living on less than 1,25 USD a day at 
2005 international prices, World Development Indicators (WDI), 
The World Bank 
SOI anomaly Southern Oscillation Index anomaly average measured in January 
and June.  National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA). Spreadsheet available at 
http://www.cpc.ncep.noaa.gov/data/indices/ 
OECD policy See details 
Inflation Inflation,  consumer  prices  (annual %), World Development 
Indicators (WDI), The World Bank 
Trade Trade  openness  is  the  sum  of  exports and imports of goods and 
services measured as percentage of GDP, World Development 
Indicators (WDI), The World Bank 
Democracy (polity 
score) 
Difference between a democracy index (0-10) and an autocracy 
index (0-10), Polity IV Project. Spreadsheet available at 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm 
 
 
                                                          
iThe sample also includes some economies that recently became members of the OECD. 
iiWe exclude from this sample Australia and New Zealand that are included in the sample of the OECD countries. 
iiiThey calculated the total food import and export in monetary terms, including all the commodities present in the 
categories: Meat and Dairy Products, Grains and Cereals, Vegetables and Fruits (Standard International Trade 
Classification (SITC) Rev.2). Ng & Aksoy (2008), however, do not consider the data before the '80s, which we 
calculate by adopting their same methodology using UN COMTRADE data. 
ivAll agricultural commodities include Raw Food (Meat and Dairy Products, Grains and Cereals, Vegetable and 
Fruits), Cash Crops (Figs and Nuts, Tropical Products, Feeds, Oilseeds and Tobacco), Other Food (Processed and 
Seafood) and Non-Food (Agricultural Raw Materials) (Ng & Aksoy, 2008; elaboration based on UN COMTRADE 
Statistics). 
vThis World Bank’s research project includes Nominal Rates of Assistance to producers, or NRAs, together with a 
set of Consumer Tax Equivalents, or CTEs, for farm products and a set of Relative Rates of Assistance to farmers, 
initially for 75 focus countries and the database expanded to 82 countries. 
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viThe combination of border price and domestic support, and the direct assistance to input for each commodity 
provides the following rate of assistance: 
 
𝑁𝑅𝐴 = 𝑁𝑅𝐴𝐵𝑆 + 𝑁𝑅𝐴𝐷𝑆 + 𝑁𝑅𝐴𝑖 
In details, the NRABS (Nominal Rate of Assistance to farm output conferred by border price - i.e. international price 
- support) represents the distortion produced by an ad valorem tax (or tariff) on competing import. For a perfect 
substitute of the domestically produced good, it is equivalent to an export subsidy. The NRADS (Nominal Rate of 
Assistance to farm output conferred by domestic price support) measures the production subsidy for farmer 
conferred by direct government intervention. The NRAi contains any tax and/or subsidy for intermediate inputs used 
in the farm production. In principle, all the three rates can be negative (Anderson, 2010b). 
viiWe also build an OECD index weighted with the share of the contemporaneous commodity production for each 
developing country. The results from the estimations do not change substantially for what concerns the signs and the 
significance of the OECD policy coefficient with respect to the ones obtained using the historical agricultural output 
in 1961. 
viiiDecoupled programs or payments are not tied to production, output level and/or market conditions, creating in this 
way less distortion in the commodity markets. 
ixThe Southern Oscillation Index (SOI) is a standardized index based on the observed sea level pressure between 
Tahiti and Darwin, measuring the large-scale fluctuations in air pressure between the western and the eastern 
tropical Pacific (The National Climate Data Center, NOOA). It measures the el Nino Southern Oscillation. For each 
year, we take the average of the SOI anomaly measured in January and June. 
xMcMillan et al. (2005, 2007) also considered the impact of OECD support on average per capita income and 
included the latter as a covariate in the estimation for the poverty headcount rate. Testing for the presence of unit 
root, however, we detect the non-stationary of the per capita income variable, using PPP Converted GDP Per Capita 
(Chain Series) at 2005 constant prices, Penn World Tables 7.1. For this reason, we focus our analysis only on the 
headcount poverty rates and exclude the per capita income as regressor. The original framework did not take into 
account the degree of democracy. 
xiFor the other samples, we compute the only groupwise heteroskedasticity. 
xii
We use the GLLAMM package proposed for Stata software (Rabe-Hesketh, Pickles, & Skrondal, 2001). 
xiii
With respect to the other estimations, the FMM does not include year dummies due to the convergence problems 
of the ML function. 
